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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                    
No. 04-4278
                    
JOHN J. O'BRIEN, III, TRUSTEE ON BEHALF OF MINOR-PLAINTIFFS;
JOHN JOSEPH O'BRIEN, IV; DANIELLE O'BRIEN; BRIANA O'BRIEN;
SIMONE O'BRIEN,
                                        Appellants
v.
VALLEY FORGE SPECIALIZED EDUCATION SERVICES
d/b/a THE CROSSROADS SCHOOL
(D.C. Civil No. 03-cv-03984)
                     
No. 04-4440
                    
JOSEPHINE O'BRIEN, MOTHER AND PARENT ON BEHALF OF
MINOR-PLAINTIFFS, SIMONE O'BRIEN, BRIANA O'BRIEN, DANIELLE
O'BRIEN AND JOHN JOSEPH O'BRIEN, IV,
                                      Appellant
v.
VALLEY FORGE SPECIALIZED SERVICES CORPORATION
doing business as THE CROSSROADS SCHOOL
(D.C. Civil No. 03-cv-05695)
                    
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
District Judge:  The Honorable R. Barclay Surrick
                    
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
      Our review of the District Court’s grant of Crossroads’ motions to dismiss is plenary. 1
“In reviewing the motion to dismiss, we must accept as true all facts alleged in the
complaint and view them in the light most favorable to” the O’Briens.  In re Merck &
Co., Inc. Sec. Litig., 432 F.3d 261, 266 (3d Cir. 2005).  
2
March 30, 2006
                    
Before: McKEE, BARRY and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges 
                   
(Opinion Filed:  April 6, 2006)
                    
OPINION
                    
BARRY, Circuit Judge
Appellants John J. O’Brien, III, and Josephine O’Brien, through their counsel John
J. O’Brien, Jr., brought separate suits in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania on behalf of their minor children, Simone, Briana, Danielle, and
John Joseph (“J.J.”), against Valley Forge Specialized Educational Services, which does
business as The Crossroads School (“Crossroads”).  In short, the O’Briens claimed that
Crossroads wrongfully seized assets found in their children’s bank accounts.  The
complaints were dismissed, and the O’Briens aver that the “sole question” on appeal
“relates to [the] seizure of [their] children[’s] . . .bank accounts.”  We will affirm.1
I.
J.J. was a student at Crossroads for four years.  The O’Briens, unhappy with the
      Crossroads also represents that “[a]t least three other appeals to the Pennsylvania2
Superior Court by the O’Briens arising out of the same subject matter have been either
affirmed or dismissed.”  (Appellee’s Br. at 2 n.1.)
3
services being provided by Crossroads, enrolled him in a public school for the 1999-2000
academic year.  They refused, however, to pay Crossroads the entire sum of tuition
charged for the final year at Crossroads.  Crossroads sued the O’Briens in Pennsylvania
state court to recover the unpaid tuition.  It prevailed, and the court entered judgment on
February 5, 2002 for $15,134.00, the full amount of the outstanding tuition.  The
O’Briens appealed.  The Pennsylvania Superior Court quashed the appeal, which it
described as “rambling” and “largely incomprehensible.”   (A70, 04-4278)2
When they appealed, the O’Briens failed to post a bond to stay execution of the
judgment.  See Pa. R. Civ. P. 3121(a) (providing for a mandatory stay of execution, inter
alia, “upon the entry of bond with the prothonotary, in the amount of plaintiff’s judgment,
including probable interests and costs, or in such lesser amount as the court may direct 
. . .”).  Consequently, Crossroads executed on the judgment, obtaining and serving three
writs of attachment on bank accounts at the First Union National Bank on March 13,
2002.  In response, the O’Briens filed a motion to vacate and set aside the attachment and
levy in the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, contending that they received improper
notice and that assets of their children were seized, raising wholly state law grounds for
relief.  (A33-34)  The court dismissed the motion, and the O’Briens appealed again
      The Pennsylvania Supreme Court declined to hear the case.3
      The District Court also dismissed the FDCPA claim “[b]ecause no relief could be4
granted under the FDCPA for any set of facts consistent with the allegations contained in
Plaintiffs’ complaint.”  (A9-10, 04-4440)
4
without posting a bond.  The Superior Court affirmed the dismissal.  (A73, 04-4278)3
The O’Briens were not deterred.  John J. O’Brien, III, filed a complaint in federal
court on July 3, 2003, later amended, and Crossroads moved to dismiss the complaint on
August 5, 2003.  The District Court, observing that the complaint was “not a model of
clarity,” discerned that the “primary claim appear[ed] to be that the attachment of the
minor Plaintiffs’ bank accounts without prior notice violated their Due Process rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment.”  (A7, 04-4278)  O’Brien also “assert[ed] a number of
state law grievances,” (id.), ultimately requesting that the attachment and levy be set aside
and the assets returned.  The District Court did not need to reach the question of whether
the children’s assets were wrongfully attached, dismissing the case on alternative
grounds; the claims were barred both by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, as well as by res
judicata.  
Josephine O’Brien brought a separate suit in the District Court, “aris[ing] out of
exactly the same circumstances . . . ,”  (A3, 04-4440), and claiming violations of the
Fourteenth Amendment and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15
U.S.C. §§ 1692 et. seq.  The District Court dismissed that action as well under Rooker-
Feldman,  and warned counsel about the potential consequences of persisting to press4
5legal claims arising out of these events.  (A11, 04-4440 (“We caution Plaintiffs’ counsel
that in light of this decision and our earlier decision in O’Brien v. Valley Forge
Specialized Educ. Servs. Corp., . . . any future complaints regarding the subject matter of
this litigation may very well run afoul of Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, warranting the imposition of
sanctions.”))
Again undeterred, the O’Briens appealed to this Court.  The appeals were referred
to the Appellate Mediation Program.  A representative of that program inquired of the
bank and received confirmation that the children’s bank accounts were intact.  The
O’Briens concede in their brief that their children’s “bank accounts had never been
seized.”  (Appellants’ Br. at 5.)  Nonetheless, they press on, contending that the
investigation revealed a seizure by Crossroads of $661.44 “which was in excess of the
judgment debt the school had obtained in the sum of [$15, 134.00].”  (Id.)  
II.
We need not linger long over these appeals.  The O’Briens do not challenge the
District Court’s Rooker-Feldman analysis nor its application of the doctrine of res
judicata.  The arguments have been waived.  Moreover, the “sole question” on appeal, as
the O’Briens and their counsel frame it, is the propriety of the seizure of the children’s
bank accounts.  No such seizure occurred, as they now concede, requiring affirmance in
any event.  
As it was never raised in the District Court, the argument centering on the $661.44
      The O’Briens raise other arguments in a haphazard manner, none of which will be or5
need be addressed here.
6
is not before us.  We also note that apparently the $15,134.00 is still owed, along with
interest, to Crossroads.  In short, in addition to not being preserved for appellate review,
the claim is of dubious merit.5
III.
This litigation, and its “tortured history,” (Appellee’s Br. at 2), should have long
since ended.  The O’Briens and their counsel have not been deterred by the quashing of
their initial state appeal by the Pennsylvania Superior Court, nor by the subsequent losses
in the state forum, nor by the District Court’s alternative grounds for dismissing their
complaints and its reference to Rule 11, nor, remarkably, even by their own admission
that the bank accounts “had never been seized,” (Appellants’ Br. at 5), the “sole question”
presented on appeal. (Id. at 2.)  
This persistence in pressing appellate arguments utterly lacking in merit calls to
mind Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.  See id. (“If a court of appeals determines
that an appeal is frivolous, it may, after a separately filed motion or notice from the court
and reasonable opportunity to respond, award just damages and single or double costs to
the appellee.”).  Cf. Beam v. Bauer, 383 F.3d 106, 109 (3d Cir. 2004) (“[D]espite many
cues from us and the District Court that her cause was wholly meritless, Beam and her
counsel have persisted before the District Court and again before us.”).  Crossroads seeks
      Crossroads contends that we have “the discretion to sanction a party for bringing a6
frivolous appeal.”  (Appellee’s Br. at 14.)  “Although often mistakenly referred to as both,
an award under Rule 38 is neither a sanction nor a punishment . . .  The rationale of Rule
38 is simply that when parties suffer pecuniary loss by paying attorney’s fees to defend a
valid judgment against a frivolous appeal, they are as entitled to be awarded damages as
is a victim seeking compensation for any other financial loss incurred by the acts of a
tortfeasor.”  Beam v. Bauer, 383 F.3d 106, 108 (3d Cir. 2004).
7
Rule 38 damages in their brief,  a request to which the O’Briens have not replied, but6
have not filed a separate motion.  “We will leave it to [Crossroads] to determine whether
they wish to petition for such an award.”  Beam v. Bauer, 88 Fed. Appx. 523, 526 n. 1 (3d
Cir. 2004) (unpublished); see Beam v. Bauer, 383 F.3d 106, 110 (3d Cir. 2004) (awarding
Rule 38 damages).   
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
